A regime’s ability to determine the footprint of the bridge network is thwarted by having a large number of ordinary citizens around the world run bridges in theory, a large and growing number of bridge nodes will keep Tor one step ahead of someone attempting to block Tor. However, the effectiveness of the bridge network is directly proportional to the number of devices that are serving as a relay. Crossing the bridge requires getting a list of bridge relay nodes from a relay server that will only reveal a couple relay nodes at a time to a gmail email address, so as to foil regimes attempting to resolve the distributed relay network by simply repeatedly querying the relay server. Because of its well-defined footprint, someone with sufficient authority can “cut it out” by simply ripping out all of its connections to the rest of the world.Ī Bridge Relay (or a bridge for short) “diffuses” the edges of Tor by adding another hop between a semi-secret distributed relay network and the public edge of Tor. In other words, once you enter Tor, you have enhanced anonymity, but Tor itself has a clear and public footprint on the internet. Bridge relays are needed because policy-making entities can “filter” Tor by querying the list of public Tor exit and entrance nodes, and consequently direct the country’s internet authorities to block all Tor nodes. Recently, Jacob Appelbaum pinged me and asked if it would be possible to make a Tor Bridge Relay client for the chumby One. Protecting free speech is important to me. This is important, especially for people who live and work in oppressive regimes where direct access to on-line social networking is restricted, and where your opinions can put your life at risk. For those who are unfamiliar with it, in a nutshell, Tor can enhance your anonymity on the internet: it obscures who you are, and what sites you are visiting. Tor is an open-source project that is dear to me for many reasons.
0 kommentar(er)
